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Siren Songs and Echo’s Response: Towards a Media 
Theory of the Voice in the Light of Speech Synthesis 
_Abstract 
In contrast to phonographical recording, storage, and reproduction of the voice, most 
media theories, especially prominent media theories of the human voice, neglected 
the aspect of synthesizing human-like voices by non-human means. This paper takes 
this lacuna as a starting point for an inquiry into the media theory of (non)human 
voices under the premise that the epistemological difference between techn(olog)ical 
voice production and its mere re-production is illuminated by the mythological motifs 
of the Sirens and Echo, respectively. Interestingly, the interconnection between terror 
and tempting nonhuman voices, which is implemented in the cultural imaginary 
through the Sirens’ song, can be identified in the media history of speech synthesis, 
which challenges the idea(l) of the human voice as an anthropological constant. The 
main concerns here are to re-read the critique of Derrida’s Of Grammatology and other 
theories of the human voice in the light of speech synthesis and show how the oft-
used term ‘disembodied voice’ is inadequate when it comes to describing phonograph-
ical, radiophonic, and telephonic hearing situations. 
1_Mythological Recursions: Echo and the Sirens 
We already have a foreboding that phonocen-
trism merges with the historical determination of 
the meaning of being in general as presence [...].1 
Mankind’s fascination with the human voice is as old as mankind itself. In two of the 
most prominent collections of ancient myths — Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Homer’s 
Odyssey — the human voice is a crucial topos. The specific role and epistemic-situa-
tional embeddedness of the (non)human voice in both myths-collections reveal its two 
main media techniques, namely, phonographic voice reproduction and synthetic voice 
production.2 
In the Metamorphoses, Ovid writes about the meeting of Narcissus and Echo, who 
is still embodied. Echo, once a noisy and talkative nymph, has been punished by being 
able to only repeat words that have been said before. Therefore, her encounter with 
Narcissus can be described as a conversation with a recursive structure, consisting of 
his words and her replaying of his words in the same temporal pattern but with altered 
semantic meanings. In the words of Ovid, Echo is: 
A nymph whose way of talking was peculiar 
In that she could not start a conversation 
Nor fail to answer other people talking. 
Up to this time Echo still had a body, 
She was not merely voice. She liked to chatter, 
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But had no power of speech except the power 
To answer in the words she last had heard. 
Juno had done this: when she went out looking 
For Jove on top of some nymph among the mountains, 
Echo would stall the goddess off by talking 
Until the nymphs had fled. Sooner or later 
Juno discovered this and said to Echo: 
“The tongue that made a fool of me will shortly 
Have shorter use, the voice be brief hereafter.” 
Those were not idle words; now Echo always 
Says the last things she hears, and nothing further.3 
The Sirens, on the other hand, are not restricted to reproduction. In the Metamorphoses, 
Ovid describes the Sirens as women who, as a result of their punishment, were endowed 
with feathers, wings, and birds’ feet. Their tempting and beautiful voices enchant and 
attract passing seafarers. In other words, the “sweet-voiced Sirens”4 are not human, but 
have human voices. In the Odyssey by Homer, a horrified Circe warns Odysseus about 
the Sirens’ song: 
Your next land-fall will be upon the Sirens: and these craze the wits of every mor-
tal who gets so far. If a man come on them unwittingly and lend ear to their Siren-
voices, he will never again behold wife and little ones rising to greet him with 
bright faces when he comes home from sea. The thrilling song of the Sirens will 
steal his life away, as they sit singing in their plashet between high banks of 
mouldering skeletons which flutter with the rags of skin rotting upon the bones.5 
When sailing near the Sirens’ island, Odysseus plugs his sailors’ ears with wax (the 
first historical mention of earplugs) and commands them to tie him to the mast of his 
ship. In this position, unable to move and follow the Sirens’ invitation to visit them but 
able to hear their song, while the sailors are able to move but unable to hear, Odysseus 
became the only man to hear the Sirens’ tempting song from a safe distance. 
In a media-theoretical re-reading, the two myths reveal an opposition between voice 
reproduction — phonographic techniques — on the one hand, and technical media of 
voice production — speech synthesis — on the other. At the same time, this opposition 
juxtaposes human with nonhuman speech. Although many analyses have emphasized 
the question of gender in the Sirens’ episode, the more fundamental point is to recog-
nize that the Sirens are nonhuman beings. The song of the Sirens is a chanted articula-
tion by the nonhuman: synthetic speech avant la lettre. 
In its literal sense, ‘phonography’ means sound- or voice-writing, as it combines the 
Greek phōnē (sound, voice) and graphē (writing). It refers not to writing about sound 
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(as this essay does) but to the actual writing of sound itself, which gives sound its ma-
terial, indexical, graphical, and, therefore, objective equivalent as time-invariant, fixed 
materiality. Édouard-Léon Scott de Martinville, the inventor of the phonautograph, an 
autonomous sound writer and the first practical apparatus for actually writing sound,6 
used such terminology as early as 1857 when describing the uniqueness of his machine 
as “[l]e son, aussi bien que la lumière, fournit à distance une image durable; la voix 
humaine s’écrit elle-même (dans la langue propre à l’acoustique, bien entendu) sur 
une couche sensible (...).”7 The knowledge of such a non-arbitrary form of writing 
sound as sound graphs (as opposed to using the arbitrary alphabetical notation) pro-
vides a transition towards the material dimension of sound and, as such, constitutes a 
necessary precondition for phonography. These sound graphs, as auditory traces, may 
support Jacques Derrida’s assumption that “[a]ll graphemes are of a testamentary es-
sence,”8 but the main fact remains: phonographic voices are vocal, non-alphabetical 
recordings with all the individuality of particular human voices which are indexical 
traces of human bodies. 
With the advent of the phonograph, the human voice has been subjected to the op-
erational logic of technical media that store speeches and voices as traces of the real. 
Since then, terms such as the ‘exact repeatability’ and hence the ‘suspension from cul-
tural historical time’ apply to the human voice. Fundamentally, phonographic voices 
are characterized by the fact that they can only echo what was already said. In the “Song 
of Mr. Phonograph,” the apparatus presents itself as such an echo (although this per-
sonification is a paradox in itself): “My name is Mister Phonograph and I’m not so very 
old. My father he’s called Edison and I’m worth my weight in gold. The folks they just 
yell into my mouth and now I’m saying what’s true: For just speak to me I’ll speak it 
back and you’ll see I can talk like you.”9 The song, which was commissioned by the 
Edison Speaking Phonograph Company and published in 1878, illustrates that, since 
the invention of the phonograph, echoes from the past can be replayed not just meta-
phorically but through technological means. It is thus no surprise that the American 
Edward Hill Amet marketed his own phonograph under the name Echophon from 1896 
on, while Thomas Edison, on his visit to France in 1889, was celebrated not only as the 
man who “tamed the lightning” for his research on the light bulb but also as the man 
who “organized the echoes.”10 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12354/ 
5 
The crucial aspect of the phonographical media technology is that the human being 
who originally spoke into the phonograph can be spatially or temporally absent when 
his or her voice is reproduced. It is an auditory characteristic that can be described with 
Raymond Murray Schafer’s term “schizophonia,” the splitting of electroacoustic repro-
duction of a sound from its source.11 Likewise, Jacques Derrida described the aim of 
phonography as conserving spoken language, “making it function without the presence 
of the speaking subject.”12 Although this phenomenological perspective conceals the 
phonographical effect of what Vivian Sobchack named “re-presencing the past,”13 Der-
rida points to the central underlying principle of phonography when it reproduces 
speech of a “speaking subject,” that is, a human. 
The singing of the Sirens and media techniques of speech synthesis are not restricted 
to mere reproduction in the way that Echo and phonography were. Speech synthesis 
produces human-like speech that originates from a mechanical or technological appa-
ratus or, nowadays, from techno-mathematical software that can produce speech that 
no person uttered before. One common principle of speech synthesis is the so-called 
‘concatenative method,’ which concatenates small units of pre-recorded speech and 
stores them in a database. An alternative to this method is so-called ‘articulatory syn-
thesis,’ a technique that is based on a model of the human vocal tract — be it the mod-
ern, digital, and, therefore, computational simulation on a computer or the literally an-
alog(ical) imitation of the human speech organs, such as Wolfgang von Kempelen’s 
speaking machine from 1791 or Joseph Faber’s speaking machine Euphonia, which 
was introduced in Vienna in 1840. The main difference between the former and the 
latter lies in the involvement or non-involvement of a human speaker. Whereas concat-
enative methods employ human language that is separated into small short-time record-
ings, articulatory synthesis produces human speech in a totally artificial way. In other 
words, human-like speech is created through thoroughly nonhuman means. In the con-
text of digital speech synthesis and its software, it is thus obvious that what is written 
on a code level — the writing of complex algorithms — is not derived from speech 
(Ferdinand de Saussure’s thesis). Rather, speech is subordinate to writing, which allows 
for a re-reading of Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology regarding his explanation that 
speech also follows the logic of writing, i.e., the logic of signs. 
Contemporary observers of the two types of speaking machines — the phono-
graphic, on the one hand, and the actual speaking machines, such as Joseph Faber’s, on 
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the other — emphasized their disparity in quality. As early as 1878, the French Count 
Théodore Achille Louis du Moncel noted in his book Le téléphone, le microphone et 
le phonographe that “there is a great difference between the production and the repro-
duction of a sound, and a machine like the phonograph, adapted for the reproduction 
of sound, may differ essentially from a machine which really speaks.”14 Du Moncel 
further remarked that the reproduction of sound and even articulate sound may be very 
simple (which the phonographic principle actually was) whereas the production of ar-
ticulated sounds required a number of special organs analogous to the human ‘speaking 
apparatus.’ Although du Moncel’s historical situatedness allowed him access only to 
knowledge of a speaking machine that emulated human speech (to use a term from 
computer science), his assessment also applies to digital speech synthesis. 
Given that the emergence of technical media like the phonograph and cinemato-
graph and their capacity to store, repeat, and manipulate the effects of human presence 
began to change the very parameters of the term ‘presence’ in the late 19th century,15 it 
is essential to acknowledge that those parameters had to undergo a second shift of em-
phasis, which was related to technologies and techniques of speech synthesis. Speech 
synthesis bridges the alleged dichotomy of absence and presence, as synthetic voices 
constitute an acoustical presence of non-existing human bodies and therefore represent 
a purely nonhuman presence. Such an account appears oxymoronic; yet, it captures the 
crucial conceptual principle of synthetic voices. It is not surprising that these questions 
of absence and presence, being and nonbeing, can also be found on the content side of 
the history of speech synthesis. For instance, the five-minute-long, 7-inch vinyl disc 
entitled “Computer Speech: Hee Saw Dhuh Kaet (He Saw The Cat),” which Bell Tel-
ephone Laboratories made available for educational use in 1963, contains original re-
cordings of synthetic speech, along with an explanation of Bell Labs’ newly developed 
computer speech synthesis technique based on punched cards. These recordings deal 
recursively with the core question of speech synthesis when the computer quotes the 
famous “to be or not to be”-passage from William Shakespeare’s “Hamlet.”16 This fun-
damental question of being/nonbeing can also be identified in early debates and ques-
tions on synthetic speech. Was it the voice of a human that could be heard from a figure 
or apparatus (via hidden speaking tubes or even hidden speaking humans), or was it a 
synthetic voice? In other words, was it a human or a nonhuman voice that could be 
heard; was it Echo or a Siren? 
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While the human voice is usually the essential and radical condition (or, more pre-
cisely and literally, articulation) of human presence, it is the synthetic voice that is most 
challenging to the human (it)self. Through synthetic speech, the voice as immediate 
security of the human speaker loses its one-to-one correlation with the human body. 
Voices are not restricted to the realm of the human and humanity anymore but can be 
produced through technical media. If the voice and the ability to speak are the phenom-
enon and ability that have been used to distinguish the human from the nonhuman, as, 
for example, Aristotle did with his postulate that a voice is the sound produced by a 
creature possessing a soul (De Anima, 420b5-6), then speech synthesis explodes this 
existential constitution of the voice. This puts Western logocentrism into the vexing 
position that nonhuman objects can also have a voice. To understand this, a short over-
view of the Derridean conceptualization of signs (more precisely, the deconstruction 
of phonocentrism) is helpful. 
2_Phono-Logo-Centrism ≠ Voice as Message 
For Derrida, the voice is more than just a medium for communication. Instead, it is the 
source of Western idea(l)s of truth, presence, and being. Derrida’s 1967 book on the 
neologism ‘grammatology’ — the knowledge of the letter, writing, and the written — 
is a critical re-reading of the entire Western philosophical tradition with the intention 
of considering the voice as a sign and aligning speech with the theory of signs, thereby 
overcoming oppositions dating back to antiquity. Derrida thereby relates Western 
phono- to logocentrism. ‘Logos,’ in a broad sense, means speech and its sense but also 
(the faculty of) reason. Therefore, logocentrism is “the belief that the first and last 
things are the Logos, the Word, the Divine Mind, the infinite understanding of God, an 
infinitely creative subjectivity, and, closer to our time, the selfpresence of full self-
consciousness.”17 According to Derrida, the originary presence of human beings is to 
be found in the human voice and the human ability to express mental experiences. Der-
rida traces this tradition of thought back to Aristotle, who referred to spoken words as 
symbols of mental experience and to written words as the symbols of spoken words. 
Put differently, written words are mere symbols of symbols and therefore supposed to 
be further away from human thought and actual presence.18 Derrida also draws on 
Plato’s literary dialogue, the Phaedrus. In this dialogue, which can be identified as the 
first genuine media critique of writing, Plato argues that the written is a silent image of 
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the spoken, just as paintings may have the appearance of liveliness but are in fact silent. 
Plato implicitly characterizes written signs as dead, whereas spoken, communicational 
interaction stays on the side of the living. 
Responding to such theories about speech and writing, Derrida argues that vocal 
sound also functions and operates as a sign. This is because speech is potentially re-
peatable (its status per se is characterized by iterability, as Derrida points out), under-
standable, and ‘readable,’ even after the speaker’s death. Vocal sounds are thus intrin-
sically quotable and able to be echoed, even before sounds could be technically repro-
duced. The Western notion and idea(l) of the immediacy of speech is thus a phantasm 
for Derrida. The main aim of his Of Grammatology is thus the “deconstruction of pres-
ence”19 because “[i]mmediacy is [always] derived.”20 
In pursuing this line of argument, Derrida manages to avoid binary oppositions such 
as speech/writing, presence/absence, proximity/remoteness, outside/inside, meaning/ 
representation, being/nonbeing (and, therefore, also human/nonhuman), and so forth. 
However, his argument deliberately conceals one dimension of the phoné, the vocal 
sound, that is to say that voice and speech are not equivalent, although they are deeply 
intertwined. Speech involves rhetorical, linguistic, and semantic categories whereas 
voice is the pure sound of speech, i.e., its materiality. The same difference holds be-
tween (technical) media and their content. Media are the precondition, the condition of 
possibility in the terms of Michel Foucault, the arché for communication (be it the 
Aristotelian metaxy, air, or complex digital computers). A genuine media-theoretical 
intervention can begin exactly at this point, following the maxim of Marshall McLuhan 
that it is not the content of a medium that is its message but the medium itself. The 
same fundamental difference between form and content applies to voice and speech. 
This reflection of the material foundation of communication and, therefore, the physics 
of speech is at the same time the advent of speech synthesis, as exemplified by the 
pioneering research of German physicist Christian Gottlieb Kratzenstein in 1779 on the 
production of vowel sounds.21 
Although Derrida implicitly applies his theoretical analysis to speech’s semantic 
categories, understanding his theoretical foundation of the relationship between speech 
and writing and their intertwining requires a re-reading in the light of digital speech 
synthesis. Digital speech synthesis is based on complex algorithms, which is to say 
writing, even though written code cannot be read as alphabetical language, as was the 
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case at the time of Plato’s Phaedrus. Plato argues that speech is prior to writing, but 
the opposite relationship applies in the case of digital speech synthesis: the hidden, 
written algorithmic structure precedes speech. The symbolism and symbolic character 
of speech is apparent when language is no longer indexically connected with a human 
being but is autonomized as a sign system and even based on the regulation of signs. 
This can be illustrated also by the analog sign instruction for the speaking machine of 
Wolfgang von Kempelen. In his book Mechanismus der menschlichen Sprache nebst 
Beschreibung einer sprechenden Maschine22 (Mechanism of Human Speech Supple-
mented with a Description of a Speaking Machine, no English translation), von 
Kempelen gives a set of instructions for his instrument-based auditory alphabet that 
requires manual operation (see Fig. 1). In this concrete situation, speech is not prior to 
signs. Rather, both rely on each other. 
 
Fig. 1: Instructions for perform speech with the speaking machine of von Kempelen:  
a short circuit between speaking and writing.23 
Despite Derrida’s interest in the voice beyond categories of communication, he never-
theless conceives the voice not as a materially and physically constituted entity but as 
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a semantic system, in contrast to Mladen Dolar and his newer voice-theoretical ap-
proach. 
As Dolar points out in his book A Voice and Nothing More, we usually fail to hear 
the voice and hear only the semantic meaning of the words spoken:  
If we speak in order to “make sense,” to signify, to convey something, then the 
voice is the material support of bringing about meaning, yet it does not contribute 
to it itself. It is, rather, something like the vanishing mediator […] — it makes the 
utterance possible, but it disappears in it, it goes up in smoke in the meaning being 
produced.24 
For Dolar, the voice is the material aspect of speech, the material carrier of meaning 
and sense, but it is not in itself semantic. Therefore, Dolar’s minimalist definition of 
the voice in terms of its linguistic aspect is that which does not contribute to making 
sense,25 a definition that follows a thesis that was proposed by Paul Zumthor in his 
essay “The Text and the Voice,” in which he refers to the physical power of the human 
voice.26 
Prima facie, the materiality of the voice seems to be merely a sub-category of its 
semantic and, therefore, communicational function as a medium of messages. But it is 
precisely the materiality of the voice, its existence not as a mere sign but as an indica-
tion in the sense of Edmund Husserl,27 in contrast to the assumption of Derrida, that is 
the main feature of the individuality and uniqueness of human voices. This was also 
recognized by early radio theorists such as Rudolf Arnheim: “The pure sound in the 
word is the mother-earth from which the spoken work of art must never break loose, 
even when it disappears into the far heights of word-meaning.”28 This material quality, 
le grain de la voix (to use Roland Barthes’ expression) is, therefore, a characteristic of 
the human voice that cannot be described by linguistics. Moreover, it is the irreducible 
individuality of a voice, its being something “beyond (or before) the meaning of the 
words, their form (the litany), the melisma, and even the style of execution: something 
which is directly the cantor’s body, brought to your ears in one and the same movement 
from deep down in the cavities, the muscles, the membranes, the cartilages,”29 or, in 
more technical terms, the hardware of the voice, which is at the same time — in Sybille 
Krämer’s words — the “trace of the body when speaking.”30 
Barthes, in his essay “The Grain of the Voice,” borrows Julia Kristeva’s distinction 
between ‘phenotext’ and ‘genotext’ as a twofold opposition and modifies it to ‘phe-
nosong’ and ‘genosong’ in order to describe the two realms of the voice: semantics and 
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materiality.31 Whereas ‘phenosong’ refers to the structure and code of speech, its se-
mantic and invariant sphere, the ‘genosong’ refers to the “very materiality” of the voice, 
which has “nothing to do with communication,”32 “something which is directly the [...] 
body.”33 This means that the ‘grain of the voice’ pertains to the interconnection be-
tween and intertwining of an individual voice and a human body. Therefore, the geno-
song serves as the theoretical model that permits the description of the affects and ef-
fects of synthetic speech, since it explicitly does not involve the content of speech but 
the unique sound of certain voices that endows them with individuality, as opposed to 
the mechanical sound of purely synthetic speech. 
Like Barthes, Mladen Dolar is convinced that “[t]he voice without side-effects 
ceases to be a “normal” voice, it is deprived of the human touch that the voice adds to 
the arid machinery of the signifiers, threatening that humanity itself will merge with 
the mechanical iterability, and thus lose its footings.” Therefore, it is “[p]aradoxically 
[...] the mechanical voice which confronts us with the object voice, its disturbing and 
uncanny nature, whereas the human touch helps us keep it at bay.”34 Focusing on such 
mechanical voices from the history of speech synthesis will show that Dolar’s assump-
tion is in line with contemporary witness reports on early speech synthesis. Upon hear-
ing what Barthes calls “neutral voices” or “the whiteness of a voice,” the listeners re-
sponded with a feeling of terror; in Barthes’ words, “if sometimes that neutrality, that 
whiteness of the voice occurs, it terrifies us, as if we were to discover a frozen world, 
one in which desire was dead.”35 
3_Technotraumatic Voice Irritations36 
In a posthumous note without any contextual information, Friedrich Nietzsche de-
scribes an imaginary moment of terror: “What I fear is not the horrible figure behind 
my chair but its voice: not even the words but the dreadful inarticulate and nonhuman 
sound of that figure. Yes, as if it were talking like people talk!”37 Note that it is not the 
physical shape of the imaginary creature that frightens Nietzsche. The uncanny feeling 
and near-horror are triggered by its voice, the human-like voice of a nonhuman being, 
a voice from nowhere in the now-here. A report that is similar but was written about a 
real situation almost one hundred years earlier reads as follows: 
You cannot believe, my dear friend, how we were all seized by a magic feeling 
when we first heard the human voice and human speech which apparently didn’t 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12354/ 
12 
come from a human mouth. We looked at each other in silence and consternation 
and we all had goose-flesh produced by horror in the first moments.38 
This note comes from a witness of the speaking machine of Wolfgang von Kempelen. 
The speaking machine consisted of a wooden box with a bellows (like a bagpipe) on 
one side, which served as lungs, and a rubber funnel that served as a mouth and had to 
be modified by hand to produce different vowels (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 2: The final speaking machine of Wolfgang von Kempelen; his own sketch.39 
Another technologically similar mechanical speech synthesizer, named ‘Euphonia’ or 
the ‘Amazing Talking Machine,’ was presented by the German Joseph Faber in London 
in the Egyptian Hall around 1846. In the middle of the 19th century, this hall was com-
monly known as a place for occult demonstrations of automata that produce illusions. 
At the time, therefore, the exhibition hall was more associated with magic than with 
scientific instruments, which is what the Euphonia actually was in order to research 
human speech production. By pumping its bellows and manipulating a series of plates, 
chambers, and other apparatuses (including an artificial tongue, gums, and teeth), the 
operator could make Euphonia speak any European language (see Fig. 3). 
The English journalist John Hollingshead attended one public demonstration of the 
machine and attested in his autobiography to the strangeness of the event, calling Fa-
ber’s Euphonia a “scientific Frankenstein monster”: 
In the centre [of the Egyptian Hall] was a box on a table, looking like a rough 
piano without legs and having two key-boards. This was surmounted by a half-
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length weird figure, rather bigger than a full-grown man, with an automaton head 
and face looking more mysteriously vacant than such faces usually look. Its mouth 
was large, and opened like the jaws of Gorgibuster in the pantomime, disclosing 
artificial gums, teeth, and all the organs of speech. [...] The Professor was not too 
clean, and his hair and beard sadly wanted the attention of a barber. I have no 
doubt that he slept in the same room as his figure — his scientific Frankenstein 
monster — and I felt the secret influence of an idea that the two were destined to 
live and die together. [...] He explained its action: it was not necessary to prove 
the absence of deception. One keyboard, touched by the Professor, produced 
words, which slowly and deliberately in a hoarse sepulchral voice came from the 
mouth of the figure, as if from the depths of a tomb. It wanted little imagination 
to make the very few visitors believe that the figure contained an imprisoned hu-
man — or half human — being, bound to speak slowly when tormented by the 
unseen power outside. […] As a crowning display, the head sang a sepulchral 
version of “God Save the Queen,” which suggested inevitably, God save the in-
ventor.40 
 
Fig. 3: Joseph Faber and his ‘Euphonia’ or ‘Amazing Talking Machine.’41 
Such rhetoric, with its references to death and the undead, the sepulchral, tombs, half-
humans, and Frankenstein, was surely not coincidental but referred to the concrete ar-
ticulation of human-like speech through nonhuman means. Euphonia, whose name 
came from the Greek prefix eu-, meaning well-, and phōnē, meaning voice, was any-
thing but euphonious, or melodious, nor could the machine be described by the term 
‘euphonia’ in the medical sense of the condition of having a normal, clear voice. More-
over, it was the first machine that realized the Sirens’ song and recursively revealed its 
interconnecting of desire and death. 
On_Culture: The Open Journal for the Study of Culture 
Issue 2 (2016): The Nonhuman 
www.on-culture.org 
http://geb.uni-giessen.de/geb/volltexte/2016/12354/ 
14 
85 years after Faber’s speaking machine, in 1931, a British journalist wrote in the 
London Daily Express after listening to a synthetic voice in London: “There was si-
lence. The ‘robot’ voice had spoken. It was terrifying for the moment, almost horrible. 
I felt a tingle down my spine. I had heard a voice that was not a voice, words that had 
never been spoken.”42 The journalist was referring to experiments conducted by the 
British engineer and physicist Eric Allan Humphriss, who was working as a sound en-
gineer for the British International Film Corporation at the time. The corporation had 
just completed a sound film starring the famous American actress Constance Bennett. 
Unfortunately, the movie’s criminal character had the same name as a member of an 
aristocratic British family, who threatened to sue the film company. Since it was not 
possible to get the actress into the studio to re-record the dialogue with a different name 
for the character, a copy of the film was given to Humphriss, who manually re-worked 
Bennett’s recorded voice in her physical absence. This was possible because the sound 
film was made with an optical recording process instead of synchronizing the images 
with a soundtrack recorded on a separate phonograph disc. This new optical recording 
technology used a microphone and a photosensitive selenium cell to translate sound 
waves into patterns of light. Those patterns were photochemically captured as small 
graphic traces on a strip that ran parallel to the celluloid film. Humphriss therefore had 
to analyze which wave patterns belonged to which sounds, which meant finding the 
correlating graphic images for all phonetic components. After doing so, he was able to 
arrange those components in a new order. For public demonstration, Humphriss ar-
ranged the word ‘All-of-a-tremble,’ now absolutely synthetic, on a forty-foot-long 
strip.43 
Such techniques also allowed for the science fiction of re-vocalizing dead people in 
cases where recordings of their voices existed. For example, in a number of articles 
from the 1930s, the composer, music theorist, and journalist Arseny Avraamov pro-
posed vocalizing the writings of Lenin, who had died in 1924, with the author’s own 
voice, i.e. to synthesize his voice on the basis of his recorded speeches.44 This can be 
read media-archaeologically as an attempt avant la lettre of text-to-speech synthesis. 
Speech synthesis therefore also includes the possibility of re-presencing the past as a 
sonic event that does not necessarily have to have an acoustic event as its original. That 
reveals another horror of synthetic voices, namely that they are the active speech of 
inanimate or dead things. While the advent of phonography allowed the dead to speak, 
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such feats were limited to earlier recorded speech. The implications of synthetic voices 
go much further in that they resolve the paradox of Valdemar in Edgar Allan Poe’s 
short story “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” which arises when the protagonist 
remarks: “I have been sleeping — and now — now — I am dead.”45 What these expe-
riential and fictional reports have in common and what they programmatically exem-
plify is that they are records of the subjective terror of nonhuman, neutral voices to 
which Roland Barthes referred. 
Along with the term ‘horror,’ it is necessary to remember what Freud said in 1919 
about the uncanny: “It is undoubtedly related to what is frightening — to what arouses 
dread and horror [...].”46 In this essay, Freud refers to the German psychiatrist Ernst 
Jentsch and his 1906 article “On the Psychology of the Uncanny,” in which Jentsch 
gives a short definition of the uncanny as something that is strangely familiar and as 
the uncertainty over whether an apparently animate being is really alive or, conversely, 
whether a lifeless object might in fact be animate.47 To bolster his definition, Jentsch 
refers to literary works: “In storytelling, one of the most reliable artistic devices for 
producing uncanny effects easily is to leave the reader in uncertainty as to whether he 
has a human person or rather an automaton before him in the case of a particular char-
acter.” And, “[t]his peculiar effect makes its appearance even more clear when imita-
tions of the human form not only reach one’s perception, but when on top of everything 
they appear to be united with certain bodily or mental functions.”48 This explanation 
has led to the modern application of Jentsch’s psychoanalytical definition of the un-
canny to the field of robotics and the perception of nonhuman beings or prostheses 
under the term “uncanny valley,” which Masahiro Mori coined in 1970.49 The ‘uncanny 
valley’ refers to the fact that things that look and move almost, but not exactly, like 
living beings cause revulsion among observers (see Fig. 4). I would like to argue that 
there is also an uncanny valley in the field of acoustics, specifically, in the field of 
speech and singing synthesis. The previously mentioned reports from the history of 
speech synthesis show this. Even nowadays, experiential reports implicitly address the 
uncanny valley.50 
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Fig. 4: The uncanny valley as described by Masahiro Mori in 1970.51 
However, newer speech-synthesis software has developed to the point that it bridges 
the valley, causing positive responses among listeners. One programmatic example of 
this development is the Japanese singer Hatsune Miku, who is actually the Vocaloid2 
synthesizing software, which is a dynamic algorithm.52 
4_Telephone Sex, or Corporealities — There are no Disembodied Voices53 … 
… except in speech synthesis and psychosis. Even the phonographic voice is always 
an embodied voice because it has a clear connection to, and an origin in one, and only 
one, physical body. Therefore, when we listen to voices, we do not merely hear voices; 
we also hear bodies. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the term ‘personare’ in 
the theater of ancient Greece means the listening to the actor’s voice through the theat-
rical mask,54 which reveals the terminological and factual interweaving of the two 
terms ‘voice’ and ‘person.’ 
Although the term ‘disembodied voice’ is frequently used in media studies, commu-
nication studies, and related disciplines in the humanities, the fact that modern media 
have made the voice separable from the human body does not necessarily lead to the 
result that the separated voice itself is thereby disembodied. The ‘disembodied’ voice 
is a terminological trap, a theoretical assumption that does not stand up to the practices 
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of hearing voice recordings and voice-only communication, as with the telephone, mo-
bile telephone, voice chat software, and so forth. Some newer media theories borrow 
such phenomenological voice descriptions from the early years of radio theory without 
critically reflecting upon the terminology. As a consequence, most (media) theories of 
the human voice are self-contradictory.55 I would therefore like to employ the term 
‘disembodied voice’ as a merely phenomenological term, referring to the spatial or 
temporal absence of the speaker as a phenomenon of media-techn(olog)ically mediated 
voices. This proposal will be substantiated in the following with experiential reports 
and representative formulations from the early years of the phonograph and new neu-
rological research and theories about the unity of voice and body. 
The phonograph reminds its listeners of human presence, just as the dog Nipper, the 
trademark of the Gramophone Company, hears his master’s actual voice, i.e., hears his 
presence. Such re-presencing of familiar voices had already been remarked upon in the 
earliest year of phonography. In an article in 1877, the Scientific American reported on 
the distinct reference of phonographic recordings to their producing hardware, that is, 
the genuine speaker with a known voice: “[C]ertainly nothing that can be conceived 
would be more likely to create the profoundest of sensations, to arouse the liveliest of 
human emotions, than once more to hear the familiar voices of the dead.”56 Hence, 
Derrida’s argument, which I cited earlier, that the aim of phonography is to conserve 
spoken language, “making it function without the presence of the speaking subject,”57 
is superficial in that it deliberately conceals questions about reproducing presence 
through phonographic recordings.58 In my criticism of Derrida, I do not intend to rein-
troduce binary oppositions such as speech/writing, but I aim to emphasize that record-
ings of the human voice are actually producing a kind of presence, even though the 
speaking subject is temporally or spatially absent — a presence of the absent. This is 
also the underlying main idea and explanation of the once-popular practice of phono-
posting, the long-forgotten practice of mailing personal phonographical records, which 
was literally a practice and media-technique of voice mail avant la lettre in a media-
archaeological sense.59 Frederick Garbit’s 1878 essay “Phonographic Letters,” which 
explains that voices can be “identified” by the receiver of the envelope containing the 
phonographical cylinder, requires us to take the expression ‘identified’ literally, i.e., in 
the sense of a voiceprint;60 a voiceprint, the spectrogram of a voice, allows the identi-
fication of a person via his or her voice biometrics. Just as every person has his or her 
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own unique fingerprint, everyone has his or her own ‘voiceprint,’ a term — essential 
in the context of speaker recognition, identification, and authentication — that refers 
to the material sound aspects of a voice — just what the telephonic “it’s me” indicates. 
This identificational act goes hand in hand with an imaginary completion of the 
unity of voice and face. In the issue of Scientific American from February 12, 1887, the 
time of the advent of the telephone, an article appeared about the subjective feelings 
during the act of telephoning. The anonymous author explained that his telephonic 
shock was caused by a radically new experience, the confusion of “material non-exist-
ence” and “material existence”61 triggered by the techno-revolutionary experience of 
hearing a person speak whose body is spatially absent. Nevertheless, the author ex-
plained, “I can imagine my friend at the other end of the line. But between us two there 
is an airy nowhere, inhabited by voices and nothing else — Helloland, I should call 
it.”62 In addition, Marshall McLuhan in his famous Understanding Media was con-
vinced that “[a]s we read, we provide a sound track for the printed word; as we listen 
to the radio, we provide a visual accompaniment.”63 
The close connection and mutual interference of vocal sound and facial expression 
when articulating a certain sound has been known at least since the discovery of the 
McGurk effect in 1976. However, knowledge of the strength of the interconnection 
between the recognition of faces and voices is new. In 2011, researchers from the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Science found a structural connection 
between voice and face recognition. Helen Blank and her team identified a direct inter-
action between voice- and face-processing areas of the human brain, leading to an in-
terconnection between the recognition of voices and faces. Blank shows that, even if a 
person only hears another person talk, the area of the brain for face recognition is acti-
vated.64 Blank’s research could provide an explanation for the often irritating and chal-
lenging situation of combining a face with a voice that was previously only heard, as, 
for instance, when seeing a radio host whom one has before then only heard. This neu-
ral, imaginary completion of the voice-face-unity in the human brain also helps us to 
understand the affective power of voice recordings of familiar persons. It is a neuro-
logical manifestation of the media-archaeological thesis of re-presencing the past. Fur-
thermore, this may explain why it is so irritating and even horrifying, to use the terms 
of Roland Barthes, to hear neutral, nonhuman synthetic voices: the main irritation 
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comes not merely from the synthetic voice itself but from the neurological impossibility 
to imagine a human face for an apparently synthetic voice. 
This confirms Theodor W. Adorno’s assertion that “[t]he sound of any woman’s 
voice on the telephone tells us whether the speaker is attractive.”65 Indeed, the practice 
of telephone sex is surely the best example to illustrate this paper’s main thesis and 
programmatically outline its argument that the human voice, as the Lacanian objet petit 
a, is an object of (telephone-)sexual desire that refers to the physical materiality of the 
voice. Roland Barthes described this dimension with the term ‘grain de la voix’ and by 
borrowing the differentiation of phenotext and genotext from Julia Kristeva to describe 
the difference between semantic speech (phenotext) and non-semantic vocal sound 
(genotext), where the latter refers to the vocal identity and individuality of human 
voices that can be attractive. In the words of Roland Barthes, “[e]very relation to a 
voice is necessarily erotic, and this is why it is in the voice that music’s difference is 
so apparent — its constraint to evaluate, to affirm” and “there is no human voice which 
is not an object of desire — or of repulsion,”66 where the emphasis has to be put on the 
word ‘human.’ Consequently, the products of synthetic speech and singing fail to have 
individual, human grain, and are instead characterized through their uniform (and thus 
non-erotic) sound. This human-like speech that is actually nonhuman, as it is produced 
by instruments, media, or even software, is therefore a neutral voice in Barthes’s sense, 
which produces a kind of affective horror, a claim that can be proven with reports of 
contemporary witnesses from the history of speech synthesis. 
While Jacques Derrida’s aim in Of Grammatology was to bring speech closer to the 
dimension of signs with his fundamental critique of logo- and phonocentrism, his ar-
gumentation can be re-read in the context of speech synthesis. However, it will not be 
until the advent of a computer-created synthetic voice that sounds naturally human, 
enabling listeners to imagine a face to go with the voice, that it will become impossible 
to distinguish whether one listens to a human or a computer voice. In conclusion, the 
process of deciding whether a voice is human or not (a kind of acoustic Turing test) is 
far more complex than we thought. It is not just a question of acoustic determination 
but also, as a matter of fact and not only of hypothesis, a question of neuropsychologi-
cal facial imagination. Finally, and not only with telephone sex, the desire for a human 
voice is always also a desire for a human body, a body that does not exist in speech 
synthesis. 
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